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CONVERSION FROM SHADOW BANKING TO REGULAR BANKING;  
AN EMPERICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Yusuf Dinc* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Shadow banking became a trendy topic of argument for restructuring the financial system 
after the global financial crisis. Shadow banking is handled in conceptual manner in this 
thesis, and the conversion of special finance houses in Turkey to participation banks as a more 
important actor in the financial system is proved to be a shadow banking experience by an 
empirical analysis. Moreover, the findings of the econometric model have shown that the 
selected performance criteria were negatively affected after the conversion. The findings on 
the negative effects of the conversion are also supported by the tendencies that are inclined 
downwards. 
 
Key Words: Shadow banking, perfect shadow banking, hidden shadow banking, special 
finance houses, participation banks, deposit banks, regression, comparative performance 
analysis. 
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SHADOW BANKING 
Shadow banking is known as a combination of financial instruments and non-banking 
financial institutions. Definition of the shadow banking differs according to the viewpoints of 
the researchers. Singh and Aitken defines shadow banking as non-banking institutions. This 
definition does not tell us whether non-financial institutions are included or not? 
So Singh and Aitken give some examples of institutions for shadow banking like hedge funds, 
money market mutual funds, pension funds, Bank of New York and State Street, etc.1 Shadow 
banking itself is dynamic. It changes through regulatory arbitrage all the time. Static 
definitions for shadow banking will be useless.  
Pozsar and others defines shadow banking as market-based financial intermediation.2 Adrian 
and Ashcraft describe shadow banking through activities; financial intermediation without 
deposit and credit guarantees.3 In the same paper, Adrian and Ashcraft give the definition of 
shadow banking as financial institutions that intermediate credit, maturity, and liquidity 
without deposit insurance and no access to liquidity window of central bank. This definition is 
very similar to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) of European Central Bank’s shadow 
banking definition. FSB simply defines shadow banking as non-banking financial 
intermediation.4 Shadow banking is a result of a need. The need for alternative funding 
channels and investment vehicles is the motive of shadow banking services. Shadow banking 
uses alternative investment tools and funding channel services as competitive advantage. The 
competitive advantages of shadow banking are service for shorter investment opportunities 
and longer funding services. That means the same motive for the services of banking are also 
true for shadow banking; maturity mismatch. 
                                                          
1  Singh, Manmohan, Aitken James, “The Sizable Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System”, 
IMF Working Paper, 172, 2010, p.6. 
2  Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A. B., Boesky, H., “Shadow Banking”, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Staff Report, No. 458, Available at SSRN 1640545., 2010, p.4. 
3  Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A. B., “Shadow Banking Regulation”, FRB of New York Staff Report, (559)., 2012, 
p.2. 
4  FSB, Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues, 2011, p.1. 
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Shadow banking is an alternative for the investors that are looking for higher yield and also an 
alternative for them who are looking for very short investment opportunities. FSB is 
responsible for observing and regulating shadow banking in Europe. FSB defines shadow 
banking as non-banking credit intermediation and activities in in the same 2011 Shadow 
Banking Report.5 In the same report, FSB puts a frame for shadow banking. According to 
that, shadow banking includes credit intermediation institutes and activities beyond 
conventional banking that offers leverage and risk transfer by maturity and liquidity match or 
regulative arbitrage.6 FSB’s shadow banking definition may cause confusion on involving 
some institutions that are not shadow banks like leasing, factoring, forfaiting companies etc.7 
European Commission (EC) refers to FSB’s definition for political analysis.8 EC includes 
fund collection and utilization and widens definition. System approach for shadow banking 
definition includes both institutions and instruments. Shadow banking system combines 
institutions and activities for wider political analysis.  
Ericco et al. considers FSB’s definition on shadow banking as shortly expressing definition as 
non-bank credit intermediation. Shadow banking is mostly referred to as market-based 
financial figures on their paper. 9 Although Classens et al. express that shadow banking is 
beyond banking and financial markets when growing figures for shadow banking data in time 
series is beyond banking and financial markets.10  
Definitions with current shadow banking examples can never be enough for policy making. 
Because shadow banking is an area for regulative arbitrage and this specification brings 
dynamism to develop new instruments and activities and also new institutions. 
                                                          
5   FSB, Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues, s.1. 
6   FSB, Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues, s.3. 
7   Claessens, S., Ratnovski, L.,” What is Shadow Banking?”, IMF Working Paper, 2014, s.3. 
8   European Commission Report, Shadow Banking, Brussels, 102 Final, 2012, s.3. 
9  Errico, Luca, et al., “Mapping the Shadow Banking System Through a Global Flow of Funds Analysis.”, 
IMF Working Paper No.14/10, 2014, p.4. 
10  Claessens, What is Shadow Banking., s.3. 
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Singh and Aitken define shadow banking as the institutions besides regular banking 
institutions. Singh and Aitken count banking conglomerates as shadow banking, too.11 
Researchers try to put a frame for shadow banking with a list of institutions. Even strictly 
regulated investment banks are accepted as shadow banks. Hedge funds, money market 
mutual funds, insurance companies are other shadow banks that are commonly included in 
many researches. This approach is risky. Because the main motive of shadow banking is the 
highly developing technology that easily creates new instruments and institutions.  
Compared to regular banking, shadow banking services are diversified, discussable, and more 
innovative. Regular banks have disadvantages in offering new services with a more 
reasonable cost.12 Effective use of technology brings competitive advantage to shadow 
banking. According to Langevoort, shadow banking has advantage of technology when 
developing short-term instruments for money markets which are traditionally compensated by 
conventional banks.13  
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), which is supported by Stanford Law School, 
mentions shadow banking characteristics in their current reports as non-regulated or less-
regulated financial activities besides conventional banking.14 
Another characteristics for shadow banking is regulative arbitrage that is offered by 
deregulation.15 Regulative arbitrage reduces transaction costs and increases profit.16 Third 
characteristics of shadow banking is decentralization. Shadow banking spreads the risks and 
eliminates intermediation of conventional banking. 
                                                          
11  Singh, Manmohan, Aitken James,  “The Sizable Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking 
System.”, IMF Working Paper, 172, 2010, p.5. 
12  Schwarcz, Steven L., “Regulating Shadow Banking.”, Review of Banking and Financial Law 31.1 
(2012)., p.626. 
13  Langevoort, Donald C., “Global Securities Regulation after the Financial Crisis.” Journal of International 
Economic Law, 13.3: 799-815, 2010, s.799. 
14  Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Preliminary Staff Report: Shadow Banking and the Financial Crisis 7, 
2010, available at http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
15  Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, s.624. 
16  Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, s.624. 
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These characteristics of shadow banking cause systemic risk. 
Shadow banking’s function is completely same with conventional banking. Both of the 
financial actors intermediate credit and liquidity. The difference is hidden in the numbers of 
institutions and activities that make the same function. Conventional banks make their 
intermediation function as only one institute and with only one financial instruments; i.e. the 
deposits. On the other hand, shadow banking runs the same function with a bunch of institutes 
and financial instruments. The whole shadow banking system works like departments of a 
conventional bank. 
A systematical approach for shadow banking may bring better understanding for policy 
makers. Systematical approach considers shadow banking as a whole system with institutions 
and activities that contain financial instruments. System approach does not spare financial 
activities from shadow banks, and does not count certain financial conduits as shadow 
banking while the system easily develops new conduits for regulative arbitrage. These are the 
advantages of the systematical approach.  
Shadow banking is highly integrated with regular banking or vice versa. When a regular bank 
is perfectly integrated to shadow banking, system approach may keep this probability beyond 
policy making. This can happen when a regular bank invests only in shadow banking 
instruments. Mainly, conventional banking converts deposits to credits; on the other hand, 
shadow banking converts credits to securities.17 This is the main point that involves regular 
banking with shadow banking. Actually, Lehman Brothers’ case was an example of perfectly 
integrated regular bank. This is the main disadvantage of the systematical approach.  
 
Perfect Shadow Banking 
There are perfect shadow banks besides modern shadow banking. Perfect shadow banks are 
shadow banks that function like a perfect bank. Perfect shadow banks collect money and 
intermediate credit and liquidity under only one institution. Modern shadow banking has the 
                                                          
17  England, R.S., Black Box Casino: How Wall Street’s Risky Shadow Banking Crashed Global Finance, 
ABC-CLIO, Westport,CT, USA, 2011, s.3. 
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same function but operates the whole banking process with a collection of institutions and 
financial instruments. On the other hand the differences of perfect shadow banks from 
conventional banks are the legislative framework, deposit insurance and liquidity window of 
the central banks. Claessens and Ratnovski highlights the need for public or special guarantee 
for non-bank financial institutions.18 
Generally, on institution side, definitions in literature put a frame for shadow banking. This 
frame includes three characteristics for shadow banking institutions. Firstly, shadow banking 
institutions perform banking function in a less regulated or unregulated environment. 
Secondly, shadow banking as financial intermediaries, has no access to central banks’ 
liquidity window. Lastly, shadow banking has no public or private credit and deposit 
guarantees. 
 
SPECIAL FINANCE HOUSES OF TURKEY 
Turkey has initial examples of perfect shadow banks. The First example of Turkish perfect 
shadow banks are bankers that failed with a liquidity crisis in 1980s. Bankers were private 
institutions mostly one person businesses without capital requirements and strict license 
requirements. Bankers were financial intermediaries of 1980s that intermediated liquidity and 
credit. The motive behind the need for bankers was the interest limitation of government in 
the money markets. Governmental restriction on money markets produced bankers to satisfy 
the need for high interest expectation of investors and the need for liquidity of firms as a 
perfect shadow bank that collected money and allocated credits.  
Bankers failed with a liquidity crisis in mid-1980s because of inappropriate legislation and 
supervision. 
Another important example of perfect shadow banking is the Turkish special finance houses. 
Turkey's Special Finance Houses offered Sharia-compliant financial services based on a 
decree of December 1983 on the “Establishment of Special Finance Houses”. 
                                                          
18  Claessens, What is Shadow Banking, p.4. 
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Special Finance Houses (SFH) started to appear in the market in 1985. SFHs were interest-
free banks operating with Islamic finance principles which banned the interest. In the past 
three decades, the Turkish financial sector developed with the help of liberalization, mergers, 
technological innovations and new financial institutions. One of these important 
developments is the SFHs. SFHs were providing financial products and services based on 
Islamic principles. 
Okumus (2005) defines SFHs as the institutions providing financial products and services 
based on Islamic principles. Following the liberalization process of the Turkish economy in 
the early 1980s, the financial sector was reconstructed through liberalization that also brought 
in innovations to financial markets. In this context, the SFHs, providing financial products 
and services based on Islamic principles, were introduced to the Turkish financial markets. 
This constituted a “dual banking” system in Turkey in which interest-based banking and 
interest-free banking run their operations side by side. 
It has been suggested that the introduction of interest-free financial products and services to 
the Turkish financial markets was more of a political strategy rather than an economic or 
religious move at that time.19 Hanif mentioned that Islamic banking is not as foreign to 
business world as it is perceived by certain quarters.20 It is a business very much like 
conventional banking within certain restrictions imposed by Islamic law. 
SFHs were nothing different from Islamic banks. The business model of SFHs was based on 
profit sharing. Mainly, the pricing process is the biggest difference between the two banking 
model. Islamic banks start the whole process of pricing of conventional banks from the end of 
funding for deposits. Conventional banks first collect money and offer a certain interest rate 
then create credits. Islamic banks first create credits then make profit, and then share a certain 
percentage of the profit whatever they gain from funding with their depositors. Pricing the 
collected funds at the end is very similar to modern shadow banking business model. 
                                                          
19  Okumus, H.S., Interest-free Banking in Turkey: A Study of Customer Satisfaction and Bank Selection 
Criteria, Journal of Economic Cooperation, 26(4), 2005. 
20  Hanif, M., Differences and Similarities in Islamic and Conventional Banking, International Journal of 
Business and Social Science, 2(2), 2011. 
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 As mentioned above the SFHs was founded based on a decree of December 16th, 1983 on the 
“Establishment of Special Finance Houses” and the number of the SFHs reached 6 till 2000, 
after the initial founding. Ihlas Finance House was founded in 1995 as the last SFH but soon 
became the biggest in the market in a 5 years period. 
Ihlas Finance House was founded based on a decree of November 1994 on the ‘Establishment 
of Ihlas Finance House’ and started its operations in April 1995. In the foundation, paid 
capital of the Bank was TRL 1 million, and 90% of the shares were belonging to Ihlas 
Holding. Ownership structure was changed significantly over time. As of November 11th, 
2000, 34.59 % of the total shares were publicly listed. 
Some major figures extracted from the announced financial statements are listed here below; 
 
Table 1: Figures from Balance Sheet in TRL terms.* 
Date Asset Size Funds Collected Funded Credits Net Profit 
31.12.1995 9,206,711 6,766,380 7,660,526 166,030 
31.12.1996 43,775,490 36,262,750 37,858,552 952,650 
31.12.1997 122,853,042 105,926,592 103,219,035 2,202,341 
31.12.1998 252,192,211 214,098,371 225,572,393 5,066,596 
31.12.1999 633,561,397 543,669,411 542,312,870 9,762,342 
30.09.2000 900,799,287 75 4,881,148 754,842,411 6,595,753 
*Source: Independent Auditors Reports of Ihlas FH 
 
As of September 30th, 2000 total asset size of the Ihlas reached TRL 901 million and total 
collected funds increased to TRL 755 million in this period. Total assets rose by 42 % and 
total collected funds increased by 39 % during nine month period December 1999 to 
September 2000. Despite the fast growth asset quality and financial structure were 
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deteriorated and official authorization of the Ihlas was abolished based on authorities’ 
February 2001 decree.21  
The given reasons behind this abolishment with the decree are here below; 
‒ Levied on the EFT, swap account and blockade in the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey, and day-by-day these foreclosures increased, 
‒ Authority instituted legal proceedings according to the Law No. 6183 on the Procedure of 
Collection of Public Receivables because Ihlas Finance was not able to fulfill of its legal 
obligations against Resource Utilization Support Fund (KKDF) 
‒ Could not meet the withdrawals of the collected funds belongs to participation and 
current account holders. 
‒ Limited ability to meet its commitments due to deterioration in the financial structure. 
‒ Unsuccessful attempts to solve liquidity problems though precautions to reinforce 
financial structure. 
‒ Funding Group firms over legal limits. 
Balance sheet deterioration caused poor financial structure and a steady run started. Ihlas 
could not meet the withdrawals and inevitably failed. 
Ihlas’ sell off was subject to the Turkish Commercial Code because Banking Law did not 
cover it. The SFHs were the non-bank financial intermediaries that collect funds, give credits, 
and use leverage like perfect shadow banks. It was important not to being subject to the 
Banking Law for authorities because it meant limited ability for regulation.22 
Banks were at the center of the Turkish financial system and regulative actions was mostly 
focusing on them so the non-bank institutions were partially out of regulated environment and 
                                                          
21  Hayali, A.,  Sarili, S.,  Dinc, Y.,  Turkish Experience in Bank Shareholders’ Fraud and Bank Failure: Imar 
Bank and Ihlas Finans Case,  The Macrotheme Review, October 2012 1(1), p.125 
22  Hayali, A.,  Sarili, S.,  Dinc, Y.,  Turkish Experience in Bank Shareholders’ Fraud and Bank Failure: Imar 
Bank and Ihlas Finans Case,  The Macrotheme Review, October 2012 1(1), p.125 
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were not covered by deposit insurance. The exact need was an overall regulative 
implementation. There was one way to do an overall regulation; to convert SFHs as banks. 
This action has taken with 5411 Banking Act in 2006. 
 
Hidden Shadow Banking 
As motioned in the first section, to consider an institution as a regular bank, it must perform 
financial intermediation under banking legislative frame, must have access to liquidity 
window of the central banks, and public or private credit and deposit guarantees. In other 
words, financial intermediaries that do not meet all of these characteristics are considered as 
shadow banking institutions. Special finance houses were not meeting any of the regular 
banking characteristics. They were perfect shadow banks that were performing banking under 
one institutional roof though they did not have access to liquidity window nor public or 
private guarantees. Moreover, they were operating under a unique legislative frame that was 
separate from regular banking. From 1985 to 2001, the operations of the SFHs were perfectly 
shadow banking. In 2001, SFHs were included in the 4491 Turkish Banking Act but deposit 
insurance was not available for SFHs’ participation accounts. Because participation accounts 
were not considered as deposits in the Act.23 
SFHs were meeting only one of the characteristics of regular banking with 4911 Banking Act 
till 2006. In 2006, the 5411 Turkish Banking Act was enacted. 5411 is the current banking act 
in Turkey now. SFHs changed their names as ‘participation banks’ with the 5411 Banking 
Act. The same act brought deposit insurance and access to the liquidity window of the central 
bank for participation banks. Since then, SFHs are accepted as regular banks under the name 
of “participation banks” in theory. 
However, in practice, participation banks did not cover all the three characteristics of regular 
banking. Participation banks had the exact legislative framework with regular banks and 
deposit insurances offered for participation accounts same as bank deposits. The third 
                                                          
23   Yahşi, Fahrettin, Özel Finans Kurumları’nın Mevzuat Serüveni -
http://www.tkbb.org.tr/Documents/KoseYazilari/20130724152628.pdf 
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characteristics for regular banking as liquidity window access was also brought for 
participation banks with the regulation in theory, but in practice, the participation banks were 
not able to access liquidity window. 
From 2006 to 2012, participation banks experienced ‘hidden shadow banking’. Hidden 
shadow banking occurs as a form of regular banking, when a regular bank in theory cannot 
meet all the three characteristics of regular banking in practice.24  
Liquidity window access of Turkish Central Bank is available if banks have bonds to 
discount. Participation banks, successors of SFHs, had access with 5411 Banking Act to 
liquidity window, but in practice, the situation was opposite. There were not Sharia-compliant 
financial instruments that participation banks could invest. Since participation banks had no 
bonds in their portfolio to discount, they could not have access to liquidity window. 
In 2012, Turkish Treasury issued first Sukuk (rent certificate) as Sharia-compliant bond. Soon 
participation banks invested in Sukuk. Sukuk opened access to liquidity window of the central 
bank as a discountable bond. There were one more detail to access liquidity window and an 
interest-free contract should be signed between Turkish Central bank and participation banks. 
Soon after Sukuk issuance, Turkish Central Bank accepted to prepare and sign an interest-free 
contract.  
Since 2012, participation banks have been accepted as regular banks. There is no other 
example that converts from shadow banking to regular banking. The transition of SFHs to 
participation banks, from shadow banking to regular banking is important for policy making. 
This unique case of transition can be proved with an econometric model while the 
performance of shadow bank forms and regular bank forms can be compared. 
This paper models the performance of SFHs and participation banks. The model also 
compares SFHs and participation banks with conventional banks as control group. 
 
                                                          
24   Dinc, Yusuf, Gölge Bankacılıktan Regüler Bankacılığa Geçiş; Türkiye’deki Özel Finans Kurumları 
Örneği, PhD Thesis, Istanbul, 2015, p.73 
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METHOD AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
There are many econometric researches on performance of banks.  
No Writer Title Method Time/Place Results Year 
1 
Bashir,  
Abdel 
Hameed 
Risk and 
Profitability 
Measures in Islamic 
Banks; 
The Case of Two 
Sudanese Banks 
Panel Data  
Regression 
Sudan,  
1979-1993 
*Increasing scale increasing 
profitability 
*Increasing scale decreasing 
operational risk. 
199925 
2 
Kunt, A., 
Huizinga 
Financial Structure 
and Bank 
Profitability 
Regression 
OECD,  
1990-1997 
*Developing financial system 
decreasing profitability. 
200026 
3 
Claessen, S., 
Kunt,  
Huizinga 
How Does Foreign 
Entry Affect 
Domestic Banking 
Markets 
Regression 
80 
Countries,  
1988-1995 
*Foreign banks are less 
profitable in developed 
countries. 
*Foreign banks are more 
profitable in developing 
countries.  
200127 
4 
Boyd, J., H., 
Levine,  
Smith, 
The Impact of 
Inflation on 
financial Sector 
Performance 
Simple 
Linear  
Regression 
97 
Countries,  
1960-1995 
*Banks and financial markets 
are inversely correlated with 
inflation.  
*Inflation over %15 decrease 
performance of financial 
markets. 
200128 
                                                          
25  Bashir, Abdel-Hameed M., "Risk And Profitability Measures in Islamic Banks: The Case Of Two Sudanese 
Banks." Islamic Economic Studies 6.2: 1-24, 1999. 
26  Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Harry Huizinga, "Financial Structure And Bank Profitability", World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2430, 2000. 
27  Claessens, Stijn, Aslι Demirgüç-Kunt, Harry Huizinga, "How Does Foreign Entry Affect Domestic Banking 
Markets?", Journal of Banking & Finance 25.5: 891-911, 2001. 
28  Boyd, John H., Ross Levine, Bruce D. Smith, "The Impact Of Inflation On Financial Sector Performance." Journal of 
Monetary Economics 47.2: 221-248, 2001. 
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No Writer Title Method Time/Place Results Year 
5 
Bashir,  
Abdel 
Hameed 
Assessing the 
Performance of 
Islamic Banks: 
Some Evidence 
from the Middle 
East 
Regression 
Middle 
East,  
1993-1998 
*High leverage and higher 
rates for credits brings 
higher profitability. 
*Foreign banks are more 
profitable than domestic 
banks.  
200129 
6 
Vennet, 
Rudi V. 
Cost and Profit 
Efficiency of 
financial 
Conglomerates and 
Universal Banks in 
Europe 
Regression 
EU,  
1990-1998 
*Financial conglomerates are 
more income efficient than 
specialized competitors.  
*Multinational banks are more 
cost and profit efficient than 
domestic banks.  
200230 
7 
Hassan, 
K.,M.,  
Bashir 
Determinants of 
Islamic Banking  
Profitability 
Regression 
21 
Countries,  
1994-2001 
*Profitability performance of 
Islamic banks is positive 
correlated with equities on 
the other hand correlation 
with credit ratios are 
negative. 
*Consumers attitude, maturity 
and non-profit share income 
are indicators of 
profitability. 
*Tax are efficient, provisions 
are inefficient on 
profitability of Islamic 
banks. 
*Economic conjuncture 
effects higher profitability.  
200331 
                                                          
29  Bashir, Abdel-Hameed M., "Assessing the performance of Islamic banks: Some evidence from the Middle East", Topics 
in Middle Eastern and North African Economies, electronic journal, Volume 3, 2001. 
30  Vander Vennet, Rudi, "Cost And Profit Efficiency Of Financial Conglomerates And Universal Banks in 
Europe." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 34.1: 254-282, 2002. 
31  Hassan, M. Kabir, Abdel-Hameed M. Bashir, "Determinants Of Islamic Banking Profitability", 10th ERF Annual 
Conference, Morocco, 2003. 
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No Writer Title Method Time/Place Results Year 
8 
Naceur,  
Samy B. 
Determinants of 
The Tunisian 
Banking  
Industry 
Profitability: Panel 
Evidence 
Panel Data  
Regression 
Tunisia,  
1980-2000 
*Characteristics of bank 
explain interest margin and 
net profitability. 
*Macro-economic indicators 
are ineffective on interest 
margin and profitability.  
*Concentration on financial 
markets benefit less 
compared to competition of 
conventional banks. 
200332 
9 
DeYoung, 
R.,  
Rice, 
Noninterest Income 
and Financial 
Performance at U.S. 
Commercial Banks 
Regression 
USA,  
1989-2001 
*Well governance causes 
focus on core banking 
business. 
*Marginal increases in non-
interest income do not 
require risky transactions.  
200433 
10 
Berger, A., 
Hasan,  
Klapper,  
Further Evidence 
on the Link 
Between  
Finance and 
Growth: An 
International  
Analysis of 
Community 
Banking and 
Economic 
Performance 
Panel Data  
Regression 
49 
Countries,  
1993-2000 
*Small scale, private, 
domestic banks produce 
better economic 
performance. 
*Relatively healthy small 
scale banks mostly depend 
on high GDP growth.  
200434 
                                                          
32  Naceur, Samy Ben, "The Determinants Of The Tunisian Banking Industry Profitability: Panel Evidence." Universite 
Libre de Tunis Working Papers, 2003. 
33  DeYoung, Robert, Tara Rice, "Noninterest Income And Financial Performance At US Commercial Banks." Financial 
Review 39.1: 101-127, 2004. 
34  Berger, Allen N., Iftekhar Hasan, Leora F. Klapper, "Further Evidence On The Link Between Finance And Growth: An 
International Analysis Of Community Banking And Economic Performance", Journal of Financial Services Research 
25.2-3: 169-202, 2004. 
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No Writer Title Method Time/Place Results Year 
11 
Samad, 
Abdus 
Performance of 
Interest-Free 
Islamic Banks vis-
a-vis Interest-Based 
Conventional 
Banks of Bahrain 
Financial 
Ratio 
Analysis 
Mean and 
t-test 
Bahrein, 
1992-2001 
*No significant difference 
between Islamic and 
conventional banks’ 
profitability and liquidity. 
*Even Islamic banks last 
comers to the market, they 
perform as well as 
conventional banks. 
*Islamic banks are subject to 
less credit risks than 
conventional banks.  
200435 
12 
Yudistira, 
Donsyah 
Efficiency in 
Islamic Banking:  
an Empirical 
Analysis of 
Eighteen Banks 
Data 
Envelopme
nt  
Analysis 
18 Banks,  
1997-2000 
*Islamic banks are less 
efficient compare to 
conventional banks as 
competitors. 
*Islamic banks suffered in 
crisis but performed very 
well soon after the crisis. 
*Diseconomies of scale is true 
for Islamic banks. 
*Mergers should be 
supported. 
200436 
13 
Haron, 
Sudin 
Determinants of 
Islamic Bank 
Profitability 
Panel Data 
Regression 
Islamic 
Banks 
*Balance sheet factors is 
determining on profitability. 
*Market and scale value are 
effective on profitability. 
*Current accounts, equity and 
profit share ratio are 
effective on profitability. 
200437 
                                                          
35  Samad, A., “Performance of Interest-free Islamic Banks vis-à-vis Interest-based Conventional Banks of Bahrain”, IIUM 
Journal of Economics and Management12, no.2, 2004. 
36  Yudistira, Donsyah, "Efficiency in Islamic Banking: An Empirical Analysis Of Eighteen Banks." Islamic Economic 
Studies 12.1: 1-19, 2004. 
37  Haron, Sudin, "Determinants Of Islamic Bank Profitability." Global Journal of Finance and Economics 1.1: 11-33, 
2004. 
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No Writer Title Method Time/Place Results Year 
14 
Chantapong, 
Saovanee 
Comparative Study 
of Domestic and 
Foreign Bank 
Performance in 
Thailand:The 
Regression 
Analysis 
Panel Data 
Regression 
Thailand, 
1995-2000 
*Foreign banks are 
performing better compared 
to average domestic banks. 
*Both foreign and domestic 
banks’ performance 
increased soon after the 
crisis. 
200538 
15 
Bonin, John 
P., Hasan,  
Wachtel 
Privatization 
Matters: Bank 
Efficiency in 
Transition 
Economies 
Regression 
Transition 
Economies  
(Emerging 
EU),  
1994-2002 
*Foreign banks are more 
efficient. 
*Public banks are less 
efficient. 
200539 
16 
Berger, A., 
Patti,  
Capital Structure 
and Firm 
Performance: A 
New Approach to 
Testing Agency 
Theory and an 
Application to the 
Banking Industry 
Regression 
USA,  
1990-1995 
*High leverage and less 
capital adequacy ratio bring 
more profit. 
*Shareholder structure 
determines profitability 
efficiency.  
*Efficient profitability 
dominates agency problem. 
200640 
18 
Hassan, 
Kabir M. 
The X-Efficiency in 
Islamic Banks 
Data 
Envelopme
nt  
Analysis 
21 
Countries,  
1995-2001 
*Islamic banks are less 
efficient than conventional 
banks.  
*ROA and ROE ratios are 
highly correlated for 
calculating efficiency. 
200641 
                                                          
38  Chantapong, Saovanee, "Comparative Study Of Domestic And Foreign Bank Performance in Thailand: The Regression 
Analysis", Economic Change and Restructuring 38.1: 63-83, 2005. 
39  Bonin, John P., Iftekhar Hasan, Paul Wachtel, "Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition Countries", Journal 
of Banking & Finance 29.8: 2155-2178, 2005. 
40  Berger, Allen N., Emilia Bonaccorsi Di Patti, "Capital Structure And Firm Performance: A New Approach To Testing 
Agency Theory And An Application To The Banking Industry." Journal of Banking & Finance 30.4: 1065-1102, 2006. 
41  Hassan, M. Kabir, "The X-efficiency in Islamic Banks." Islamic Economic Studies 13.2: 49-78, 2006. 
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No Writer Title Method Time/Place Results Year 
20 
Cihak, M., 
Hesse, 
Islamic Banks and 
Financial Stability: 
An Empirical 
Analysis 
Regression 
20 
Countries, 
1993-2004 
*Small scale Islamic banks are 
financially stronger than 
small scale conventional 
banks. 
*Large scale conventional 
banks are stronger than large 
scale Islamic banks. 
*Small scale Islamic banks are 
financially stronger than 
large scale Islamic banks.  
*Islamic banks market share is 
inefficient on conventional 
banks financial 
sustainability. 
 
200842 
22 
Beck, T.,  
Demirgüç-
Kunt,  
Merrouche 
Islamic vs. 
Conventional 
Banking Business 
Model, Efficiency 
and Stability 
Panel Data  
Regression 
141 
Countries,  
1995-2007 
*There is very little significant 
differences between Islamic 
banking and conventional 
banking in business 
orientation, efficiency, asset 
quality or stability  
*Islamic banks are more cost-
efficient. 
*Conventional banks are more 
cost-efficient but less stable 
in Islamic banking 
dominated markets.  
*Strong equity structure of 
Islamic banks support higher 
liquidity and brings better 
performance in crisis period. 
201043 
 
                                                          
42  Cihak, Martin, Heiko Hesse, "Islamic Banks And Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis." IMF Working Papers: 1-
29, 2008. 
43  Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Ouarda Merrouche, "Islamic vs."Conventional Banking Business Model, 
Efficiency and Stability”, The World Bank, Washington DC, 2010. 
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1. Data and Methodology 
In this study, SFHs and its successors, the participation banks, are compared as 1998-2006 
and 2006-2014 periods to understand differences in performance. 1998-2006 period covers 
shadow banking period for Turkish Islamic banks and 2006-2014 period covers regular 
banking period. Also, for 1998-2014 period, Islamic banking group is compared to 
conventional banking as control group, to prove transition of SFHs from shadow banking to 
regular banking and to research significant differences. 
There are researches in the summary literature table that use the same method for control 
group. Iqbal used conventional banks as control group for his research on Islamic banking. 
Beck et al. compared Islamic banks and conventional banks, too. Many research on Islamic 
banking include Turkish banks. Some of the research are given in literature table.  
In this research, the main point is the break in the time period in 2006 when 5411 Turkish 
banking Act was enacted. 2006 is the year when SFHs became regular banks as participation 
banks.  
Banking performance analysis mostly use financial ratios for data sets. ROA and ROE ratios 
are the common dependent variables for econometric models on bank performance. Almost 
all of the researches on the given literature table use ROA and ROE as the key financial 
performance criteria. 
Bashir, Naceur, Hassan, Cihak, Hesse and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche consider the 
ROA and/or ROE as independent variables for financial performance criteria. 
Petekkaya and Curuk found in their research on Turkish financial market that using ROA and 
ROE as performance criteria for empirical researches on financial ratios was applicable. In 
this research, ROA and ROE are selected as performance criteria and dependent variables. 
Monthly balance sheet and income statement data were received from Banking Supervision 
and Regulation Agency (BRSA) archives. 198 observation points cover July 1998 - December 
2014 period. 
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198 observation points are regressed for SFHs and participation banks. ROA and ROE are 
used as dependent variables and regressed separately. Boyd et al. used more than one 
regression for their research on financial markets. 
In this research, the least squares multi variable regression method has been applied. General 
equality model that Haron referred in his research is diversified in this research. Haron used 
dummy variable in his model while referring to Griffiths et al. Haron also used EQTA 
(equities/total assets), TDTA (total deposit/total assets), and CoR (Cost of Risk) as other 
independent variables. Same variables used in this research are, NPL (non-performing 
loans/total loans) and NPLCoverage (NPL/provisions) ratios from Beck et al’s research. Other 
independent variables, TLTA (total loans/total assets), LITA (liquid assets/total assets), and 
LITD (liquid assets/total deposit) are also used in Samad’s paper. The selected ratios used in 3 
different researches explain profitability. Before setting the model, the SECTA 
(securities/total assets) ratio was applied, because securities are mostly involved in shadow 
banking in literature.44 To explain shadow banking with an econometric model securities ratio 
must not be excluded from the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44  Dinc, Yusuf, Gölge Bankacılıktan Regüler Bankacılığa Geçiş; Türkiye’deki Özel Finans Kurumları 
Örneği, PhD Thesis, Istanbul, 2015, p.160 
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Table 1: Table Showing the Variables Used in the Model  
No Financial Ratio Group Source Formula 
1 NPL Risk Balance Sheet Non-performing loans/Total Assets 
2 NPL Coverage Risk Balance Sheet Non-performing loans/Provisions 
3 Cost of Risk (CoR) Risk Balance Sheet Provisions/Total Credits 
4 TLTA Risk Balance Sheet Total Loans/Total Assets 
5 TDTA Liquidity Balance Sheet Total Deposits/Total Assets 
6 EQTA Liquidity Balance Sheet Equities/Total Assets 
7 LITA* Liquidity Balance Sheet Liquid Assets*/Total Assets  
8 LITD Liquidity Balance Sheet Liquid Assets/Total Deposits 
9 SECTA** Liquidity Balance Sheet Securities Portfolio**/Total Assets 
10 ROA Profitability Balance Sheet Net Profit/Total Assets 
11 ROE Profitability Balance Sheet Net Profit/Equities 
12 Shadow Variable (D) Dummy 
 
0 for SFHs 
1 for participation banks 
* Cash values, Receivables from CB, Interbank Money Mark. Op. Receivables, Receivables from Banks, Stocks and 
Bonds Ready to be Sold, Stocks and Bonds Receivables from Borrow Market, Reverse Repo Receivables are 
included in the calculation.  
**  Stocks and Bonds book, Receivables to be Sold, Fixed Assets, Stocks and Bonds to be Held at Hand until Due 
Time are included in the calculation. 
 
Constants for variables are excluded from Haron’s model since Haron used the panel data 
regression. General equality of this research is shown below;  
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ROA and ROE ratios are dependent variables. For each dependent variable, the same model is 
regressed and the results are reported. Symbols in the model represent; 
α constant for the model  
β vector for the coefficients  
σ coefficient for the dynamic variable  
γ coefficient for the dummy variable (shadow variable)  
µ vector for the error vector. 
Shadow variable (D) is also the dummy variable. Dummy takes ‘0’ value for July 1998 - 
December 2005 and ‘1’ for January 2006 - December 2014 period. This method is used to 
prove the transition from shadow banking to regular banking. The given periods represent 
shadow banking and regular banking periods in theory. Results of the model will show 
whether transition happened or not. Model set dynamic to reduce high correlation of 
dependent variables. To regress the dynamic model, the dependent variable is included in the 
model as  with  coefficient as independent variable. Same is done for ROE. 
Regression 1: Islamic banking performance  
The comparison of special finance houses and participation banks based on 1998-2005 and 
2006-2014 data. 
Regression 2: Conventional banking performance  
Comparison of control group based on 1998-2005 and 2006-2014 data. 
 
2. Estimations and Findings 
Descriptive statistics, correlation matrixes, and regression results are driven. Descriptive 
statistics and the results of the correlation matrices are given below.  
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2.1. Definitive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Descriptive statistics for participation banks are given above in the Table 2A. Standard 
deviations of ratios are less than 10%. Applied normality test for variables shows that 
variables are normally distributed except LITA and LITD ratios for participation banks. 
Descriptive statistics for conventional banks are shown in Table 2B. Standard deviations are 
less than 10% like participation banks. Normality test shows that the variables are normally 
distributed except EQTA ratio.  
Skewed and low values are between 0.172 and 0.355. Variables are slightly skewed left and 
squared mean for both regressions.  
Table 2A: 1998-2014 Definitive Statistics For Participation Banks 
  NPL NPLCOV CoR TCTA TDTA EQTA LITA LITD SECTA ROA ROE 
ROA 
(t-1) 
ROE 
(t-1) 
N of cases 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Minimum 0.028 0.329 0.016 0.453 0.614 0.043 0.048 0.059 0.014 -0.035 -0.809 -0.035 -0.809 
Maximum 0.312 0.845 0.103 0.821 0.860 0.145 0.215 0.265 0.182 0.028 0.261 0.028 0.261 
Mean 0.071 0.597 0.038 0.695 0.767 0.102 0.119 0.156 0.066 0.008 0.065 0.008 0.065 
Standard 
Dev 0.064 0.107 0.024 0.077 0.062 0.026 0.031 0.040 0.044 0.009 0.125 0.009 0.125 
SE Skewness 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 
Kurtosis(G2) 2.690 -0.361 0.444 0.827 -0.019 -0.733 0.154 -0.321 -0.091 4.632 17.431 4.652 17.402 
SE Kurtosis 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.345 0.345 
SW Statistic 0.642 0.956 0.736 0.905 0.914 0.944 0.991 0.993 0.903 0.877 0.679 0.876 0.678 
SW P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
                           
Table 2B: 1998-2014 Definitive Statistics For Deposit Banks  
    
  NPL NPLCOV CoR TCTA TDTA EQTA LITA LITD SECTA ROA ROE 
ROA  
(t-1) 
ROE  
(t-1) 
N of cases 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Minimum 0.000 0.286 0.010 0.196 0.545 0.071 0.173 0.312 0.112 -0.112 -1.508 -0.112 -1.508 
Maximum 0.373 0.909 0.195 0.620 0.681 0.146 0.420 0.696 0.516 0.035 0.406 0.035 0.406 
Mean 0.074 0.734 0.05 0.415 0.617 0.112 0.286 0.462 0.284 0.009 0.080 0.009 0.080 
Standard 
Dev. 0.074 0.177 0.042 0.129 0.036 0.015 0.053 0.078 0.107 0.012 0.146 0.012 0.146 
SE Skewed 0.172 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 
Kurtosis(G2) 5.376 -0.089 2.508 -1.395 -1.077 0.293 -0.215 -0.331 -0.602 46.460 72.562 46.225 72.200 
SE Kurtosis 0.343 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.345 0.345 
SW Statistic 0.645 0.824 0.703 0.928 0.934 0.982 0.962 0.971 0.929 0.660 0.530 0.661 0.531 
SW P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Correlation matrices for participation banks and conventional banks are given below in Table 
3A and Table 3B. Results show high correlation between ROA and ROE ratios. The results 
are normal since the same denominator for calculation of ROA and ROE ratios is the same. 
Hassan had the similar results for ROA and ROE ratios in his work.  
Table 3A: 1998-2014 Correlation Matrix For Participation Banks  
 
 
  NPL 
NPL 
COV CoR TCTA TDTA EQTA LITA LITD SECTA ROA ROE D 
ROA 
(t-1) 
ROE 
(t-1) 
NPL 1 
             
NPLCOV -0.708 1 
            
COR 0.956 -0.537 1 
           
TCTA -0.869 0.539 -0.850 1 
          
TDTA 0.297 -0.141 0.341 0.046 1 
         
EQTA -0.151 0.190 -0.090 0.080 -0.312 1 
        
LITA 0.398 -0.082 0.354 -0.458 0.026 0.341 1 
       
LIKF 0.271 -0.026 0.214 -0.444 -0.295 0.408 0.945 1 
      
SECTA 0.727 -0.424 0.795 -0.836 0.034 -0.104 0.048 0.027 1 
     
ROA -0.461 0.365 -0.423 0.390 -0.068 0.505 0.025 0.039 -0.390 1 
    
ROE -0.465 0.369 -0.447 0.347 -0.029 0.322 -0.022 -0.014 -0.339 0.928 1 
   
D -0.566 0.308 -0.637 0.433 -0.664 0.574 0.140 0.342 -0.584 0.318 0.205 1 
  
ROA (t-1) -0.498 0.392 -0.449 0.423 -0.064 0.494 -0.012 0.005 -0.397 0.844 0.798 0.340 1 
 
ROE (t-1) -0.506 0.398 -0.471 0.394 -0.015 0.304 -0.096 -0.086 -0.346 0.809 0.870 0.219 0.927 1 
Number of Observations: 197 
 
 
Table 3B: 1998-2014 Correlation Matrix For Deposit Banks  
 
 
NPL 
NPL 
COV COR TCTA TDTA EQTA LITA LITD SECTA ROA ROE D 
ROA 
(t-1) 
ROE 
(t-1) 
NPL 1 
             
NPLCOV -0.354 1 
            
COR 0.952 -0.110 1 
           
TCTA -0.725 0.500 -0.695 1 
         
TDTA 0.544 0.222 0.639 -0.530 1 
         
EQTA -0.159 0.628 0.059 0.164 0.211 1 
        
LITA 0.171 -0.087 0.227 -0.669 0.513 0.013 1 
       
LIKF 0.025 -0.194 0.050 -0.594 0.248 -0.075 0.957 1 
      
SECTA 0.050 0.583 0.308 -0.235 0.604 0.681 0.464 0.304 1 
     
ROA -0.301 0.050 -0.282 0.149 -0.039 0.226 -0.064 -0.062 0.128 1 
    
ROE -0.255 -0.020 -0.262 0.126 -0.051 0.150 -0.088 -0.083 0.059 0.981 1 
   
D -0.582 0.592 -0.536 0.905 -0.256 0.171 -0.583 -0.581 -0.141 0.129 0.108 1 
  
ROA (t-1) -0.252 0.090 -0.235 0.133 -0.015 0.215 -0.039 -0.042 0.134 0.134 0.045 0.148 1 
 
ROE (t-1) -0.215 0.014 -0.225 0.111 -0.024 0.154 -0.060 -0.062 0.070 0.091 0.017 0.127 0.982 1 
Number of Observations: 197 
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NPL ratios for participation banks are negatively correlated with both of the dependent 
variables. Negative correlation of NPL ratios with profitability ratios is comprehensible. 
NPLCov ratio is positively correlated with dependent variables. Negative correlation of 
NPLCov ratios with NPL ratio put across positive correlation of NPLCov with dependent 
variables. It needs to be highlighted that the negative correlation of CoR ratio with dependent 
variables is similar to the correlation results of NPL ratio.  
TCTA ratio is positively correlated with both dependent variables. Results for TCTA 
correlation of TCTA ratios is positively correlated for conventional banks, too. TDTA ratio 
for participation banks and conventional banks is negatively correlated with dependent 
variables.  
Contrary to TDTA ratio, EQTA ratio is positively correlated with dependent variables for 
both bank groups. LITA is also positively correlated with dependent variables for 
conventional banks. On the other hand, LITA is positively correlated with ROA ratio while it 
is negatively correlated with ROE ratio for participation banks. LITA is a ratio for idle 
sources for participation banks that shows inactive assets. The situation for conventional 
banks is opposite when LITA is on the table. LITA is positively correlated with dependent 
variables for conventional banks because conventional banks invest short term securities as 
liquid assets. 
While liquid assets are idle for participation banks and less profitable for conventional banks, 
LITD ratio is negatively correlated for both banking groups since total deposits are expensive 
sources.  
One of the reasons for high correlation of TCTA ratio with dependent variables for 
participation banks is the negative correlation of the SECTA ratio. Because there were no 
securities for participation banks to invest. The SECTA ratio is positively correlated for 
conventional banks while conventional banks gain yields from wide variety of securities.  
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2.2. Regression Findings 
A two-Step process was followed in estimating the multi-variable regression models. Firstly, 
the reference model that included all the variables was estimated, and then the variables that 
produced meaningless coefficient estimations were eliminated one-by-one, and the model that 
gave the most meaningful coefficient values was achieved. Since almost all of the models that 
were estimated gave extremely high r-square values, it is observed that the explanation power 
of them is high. High F values, and the F values at 1% significance level indicate that the 
general significance of the models is also high. The first delay of the dependent variable was 
used as the additional explanatory variables in order to consider the dynamic effects of the 
time on profitability performance in the models. For this reason, the issue of whether the 
successive autocorrelation is a problem or not was tested with Durbin-h Test instead of 
Durbin-Watson Test. Although the results of this test show that there is a successive 
regression problem in some models, this is not a problem in many other situations. However, 
it was also observed that the coefficient estimations of the models with or without successive 
regression problem were consistent at an important level. In this context, no drawbacks were 
considered in estimating the meaningful model coefficients. The model which had the most 
meaningful variables was used. The findings in Table 4 for Participation Banks reached the 
meaningful model with similar variables for the ROA and ROE values, which were selected 
as performance criteria. For the 1998-2014 period, the NPL and NPLCov ratios in the 
regressions of both dependent variables were not at a meaningful level, and these two 
independent variables were not included in the most meaningful model.  
The regression results of these ratios could not be associated with the correlation results; 
however, it is clear for the deposit banks that the effects of the negative correlation value in 
NPL on the dependent variables is more limited than those of the Participation Banks. This 
situation may be explained with the fact that the active distribution of the deposit banks 
consists of less credits than the Participation Banks. Participation Banks are more willing to 
convert their resources into credits because there are limited interest-free stocks and bond 
access in the market. Deposit Banks canalizing their investments to fixed-yield securities in 
an environment in which the inflation is decreasing ensures that the increase in the NPL is 
absorbed. Moreover, Deposit Banks packing their defaulter credits and selling them to Asset 
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Management Companies make it possible for them to decrease their losses that stem from 
NPL. Until recently, this option has not been possible to implement for the Participation 
Banks due to the ratification conditions. The positive correlation of the NPL Cov ratio with 
dependent variables being lower for Deposit Banks may be explained with the Deposit Banks 
traditionally allocating lower provisions for non-performing loans, and holding less idle 
resources under this item. The CoR ratio, parallel to the NPL ratio, is negatively correlated 
with dependent variables.  
In the model that was established with the ROA dependent variable, the additional TDTA, 
LITA, and LITD ratios could not find a place in the most meaningful model.  
Table 4: 1998-2014 Multi-variable Regression estimations of Participation Banks  
                              
  
Dependent Variables 
  
ROA(t)           
 
ROE(t)           
Independent Variables 
 
Coefficient t Test   Coefficient t Test   
 
Coefficient t Test   Coefficient t Test   
Constant 
 
0.075 2.145 ** 0.085 2.822 *** 
 
1.069 2.570 ** 1.346 3.720 *** 
NPL 
 
0.027 0.575 
     
0.759 1.363 
    
NPLCOV 
 
0.005 0.645 
     
0.110 1.138 
    
COR 
 
-0.226 -2.184 ** -0.174 -3.450 *** 
 
-4.539 -3.563 *** -3.053 -4.623 *** 
TCTA 
 
-0.043 -1.730 * -0.044 -2.168 ** 
 
-0.531 -1.725 * -0.641 -2.564 ** 
TDTA 
 
-0.054 -1.396 
 
-0.062 -1.695 * 
 
-0.882 -1.895 * -1.041 -2.362 ** 
EQTA 
 
0.153 5.016 *** 0.146 5.124 *** 
 
1.553 4.378 *** 1.365 4.212 *** 
LITA 
 
0.290 1.273 
 
0.344 1.634 * 
 
5.145 1.900 * 6.420 2.546 ** 
LIKF 
 
-0.244 -1.418 
 
-0.281 -1.750 * 
 
-4.002 -1.963 ** -4.932 -2.570 ** 
SECTA 
 
-0.068 -2.492 ** -0.069 -2.781 *** 
 
-0.514 -1.586 
 
-0.602 -2.039 ** 
Shadow Val. 
 
-0.009 -3.946 *** -0.009 -4.158 *** 
 
-0.121 -4.619 *** -0.113 -4.583 *** 
ROA(t-1) 
 
0.622 11.289 *** 0.621 11.537 *** 
       
ROE(t-1)                 0.697 14.408 *** 0.696 14.803 *** 
R Square 
 
0.761 
  
0.760 
   
0.803 
  
0.801 
  
Flat R Square 
 
0.746 
  
0.749 
   
0.791 
  
0.791 
  
F Test 
 
53.454 
  
65.841 
   
68.572 
  
83.666 
  
  
[0.000] 
  
[0.000] 
   
[0.000] 
  
[0.000] 
  
Durbin Watson Test 
 
1.686 
  
1.670 
   
1.596 
  
1.575 
  
Std. Error (1) 
 
0.005 
  
0.005 
   
0.057 
  
0.057 
  
Durbin-h Test 
 
2.209 
  
2.322 
   
4.726 
  
4.971 
  
Observation Number   197     197       197     197     
(1) Standard error of the delayed variable. 
           
Meaningful t tests at (***) %1, (**) %5, (*) %10 levels. 
          
 27 / 42 
Among the findings of the model, the effect direction of the Independent Variables for both 
dependent variables is the same as negative or positive. For the most meaningful model, the 
percentage change of the CoR ratio is negatively influential on both variables. 1% change in 
CoR influences the ROA in -0,174%. The influence of the same variable on ROE is  
-3,053%. The negative influence of the increase in the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
credits being negatively influential on ROA and ROE is the expected result. The increase in 
CoR ratio represents the increase in NPL ratio indirectly. The increase of the share of the NPL 
ratio in total credits, on the other hand, means that the profitability of the participation banks 
that will be obtained from the basic investment instrument will decrease. The negative 
influence of the CoR ratio on profitability may not be merely presented indirectly. The 
increase in CoR ratio also represents some of the idle funds of the bank. The funds that are 
idle influence the profitability ratios directly by limiting the potential credit investment, and 
show their influence with the decrease of the possible incomes that might have otherwise been 
received from offering new credits and with the potential increase in the total credits.  
According to the findings obtained from TCTA ratio, 1% change in the models established 
with ROA Dependent variable have an extremely low influence with -0.044%. According to 
the findings obtained, 1% change in the models established with ROE dependent variable of 
the TCTA ratio has the value of -0.641%. The increasing values of the TCTA ratio having 
negative values for participation banks although they are expected to produce positive results 
in profitability ratios shown in the data obtained from the correlation matrix may be explained 
with the reverse correlation shown in the correlation matrix of the TCTA ratio with NPL ratio. 
In other words, the rate of the total credits to total active assets being negatively correlated 
with the rate of the non-performing loans to total active assets is the result of the risk of the 
increasing credit level and, parallel to this, having negative influence on profitability ratios. 
The positive influence of the increase in the total credits in the correlation matrix of the 
profitability of the participation banks is directly related with the working style of Islamic 
banking system. The increase in total credits for participation banks, which influences the 
profit share income profitability level of the participation banks, which invest mainly on 
credits more than stocks and bonds, may explain the positive relation with the credit quality, 
which is protected with low NPL level. It is expected that the increase in TCTA ratio 
increases the quality with the decrease in NPL. Contrary to this, the profit shares received 
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from credits being shared with participation pools explains the negative correlation between 
the TDTA ratio and dependent variables. The increase in the participation funds gives rise to 
an increase in profit share expenses and thus influences the profitability ratios. The realization 
of high profits to participation pools in the decrease trend of the inflation also explains the 
negative correlation with the increase in the participation funds and dependent variables.  
According to the findings, it has been determined that the model results of the TDTA ratio 
have negative influences on the profitability ratios that are selected as the performance 
criteria. 1% change in the TDTA ratio has become -0.062% in the model that was established 
with ROA dependent variable. This value produced the -1.041% value in the model that was 
established with ROE dependent variable. The rate of the participation funds that are 
evaluated as expensive resources to total active assets producing negative influences on 
performance criteria as parallel to the negative influences on the performance criteria in 
correlation matrix is a natural result.  
1% change in the EQTA ratio which gives positive relation in the correlation matrix has an 
influence in the same direction at a rate of 0.146% when compared with the ROA dependent 
variable model results. According to the model findings that was established with ROE 
dependent variable, 1% change in EQTA ratio shows an influence in the same direction at a 
rate of 1.365%. In other words, 1% increase in EQTA ratio brings increase in profitability 
ratios as well. The resources that are provided instead of participation funds being employed 
as the source of the investment has a positive influence on profitability and give the Cheap 
Resource Effect. The importance of the increase in the use of resources for participation banks 
is revealed by the model results. Meanwhile, the increase in EQTA ratio will have a positive 
influence on the capital adequacy ratio. The increase in the capital adequacy ratio will 
strengthen the financial statement structure. The reinforcement of active growth by resources 
rather than participation funds in the assets part will provide a strong relation between the 
growth and profitability increase.  
1% increase in LITA and LITD ratios influences the ROA dependent variable at 0.344% and -
0.281% levels, respectively. 1% of the same ratios influences the ROE dependent variable at 
6.420% and -4.932% rates, respectively. The increasing share of the liquid assets in active 
assets ensures that the funds are placed in more efficient areas in a more easily manner with 
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the elasticity they have and thus have positive influences on profitability ratios. This finding 
is similar to the findings reported by Beck et al. which is given in the Literature Summary 
Table. However, the increasing values of the rates of the liquid assets to total deposits have 
negative influences on profitability ratios in a strong manner due to the expensive resources 
being held in idle position. The liquid assets which are the most important factors supporting 
the liquidity by decreasing the resource costs after providing product ratification in a wider 
spectrum that will make it possible to employ participation fund alternative in the resources 
part establishing the structure that will hold the profitability/liquidity balance at an optimal 
level will produce positive influences. Participation banks whose major resources consist of 
participation funds collect funds in participation in both the profit and loss method, i.e. the 
Community of Interest Method. In present situation, the rate of the liquid assets in total active 
assets may be increased by increasing current accounts, which are cheap assets, and 
decreasing the share rates, which are applied to the participation accounts, in favor of the 
bank; because the rate of liquid assets to total active assets is in a positive relation with 
profitability ratios. In ideal situation, on the other hand, the diversification of resources with 
new interest-free instruments and increasing the balance sheet share of the resource 
employment will have a positive influence on profitability.  
According to the model findings established with ROA dependent variable, the effect of 1% 
change in the SECTA ratio is at -0.069%. The findings obtained from the model established 
with ROE dependent variable are also in the negative direction. The influence of 1% change 
in SECTA ratio on ROE dependent variable is at -0.602% rate. The acquisition of stocks and 
bonds being new and some parts of the portfolio of participation banks not being reimbursed 
are among the important reasons of the negative influence of this ratio. The weight of the 
risks in calculating the capital adequacy ratio being lower for the government-exported stocks 
and bonds brings an indirect positive influence.  
The basic feeder of the growth is the high capital adequacy ratio. Another important factor 
leading to the negative influence of the SECTA ratio is the fact that there are no interest-free 
markets in which the participation banks in our country can make use of their stocks and 
bonds portfolios in such a way that will bring yield in a relatively short period. This finding 
shows that there might be different investment area preferences contrary to the shadow 
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banking practices that are mentioned with stocks and bonds in the world. This may be 
considered as an evidence for the investment decision liberty which constitutes the basis of 
shadow banking.  
The model results of the Control Group banks are given in Table 5, respectively, for the wide 
and narrow exemplification periods. Contrary to the model results obtained for participation 
banks, the NPLCov ratio has found a place in the most meaningful models. However, the 
constant variable like NPL has not been obtained at a meaningful level in the models. The 
LITA ratio has not been detected in the most meaningful models. The TCTA ratio has not 
given results at a meaningful level except for one of the models that were established with 
different variables.  
 
Table 5: 1998-2014 Multivariable Regression Estimations of Deposit Banks  
                               
 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
  
ROA(t) 
 
ROE(t) 
 Independent 
Variables 
 
Coefficient t Test   Coefficient t Test   
 
Coefficient t Test   Coefficient t Test   
 Constant 
 
0.001 0.009 
     
0.906 0.760 
    
 NPL  -0.031 -0.298      0.821 0.683     
 NPL COV  -0.034 -2.608 *** -0.039 -5.768 ***  -0.389 -2.535 ** -0.376 -3.424 *** 
 COR  -0.168 -0.951  -0.177 -7.268 ***  -4.210 -2.041 ** -2.857 -6.026 *** 
 TCTA  -0.037 -1.216      -0.702 -1.952 * -0.336 -1.710 * 
 TDTA  0.078 0.496  0.058 3.447 ***  -0.366 -0.200  1.093 4.580 *** 
 EQTA  0.229 2.723 *** 0.171 2.493 **  2.535 2.595 *** 2.284 2.621 *** 
 LITA  -0.019 -0.059      2.046 0.551     
 LITD  -0.048 -0.243  -0.053 -4.424 ***  -2.092 -0.910  -0.885 -5.080 *** 
 SECTA  0.042 1.816 * 0.058 4.983 ***  0.660 2.475 ** 0.478 2.632 *** 
 Shadow 
Val.  
0.005 0.989 
     
0.103 1.678 * 
   
 ROA(t-1)  -0.104 -1.549            
 ROE(t-1)                 -0.237 -3.549 *** -0.213 -3.275 *** 
 R Square 
 
0.278 
  
0.549 
   
0.289 
  
0.466 
  
 Plain.R 
Square  
0.236 
  
0.538 
   
0.247 
  
0.446 
  
 F Test  6.490   39.013    6.841   20.581   
   [0.000]   [0.000]    [0.000]   [0.000]   
 Durbin 
Watson Test 
1.635 
  
1.825 
   
1.573 
  
1.587 
  
 Std. Error 
(1)  
0.010 
  
0.011 
   
0.121 
  
0.121 
  
 Durbin-h 
Test  
2.587119 
  
N/A 
   
N/A 
  
N/A 
  
 Observation 
Number 
  197     198       197     197     
 (1) Standard error of the delayed variable. 
 Meaningful t tests at (***) %1, (**) %5, (*) %10 levels. 
           
 31 / 42 
 
The NPLCov ratio has given negative results in the models that were established with ROA 
and ROE dependent variables. According to the findings, 1% increase in the NPLCov ratio 
influences the ROA dependent variable at a rate of -0.039%, and the ROE dependent variable 
at a rate of -0.376%. The increase in the non-responding receivables, which are the idle funds, 
influences the profitability ratios in a negative and direct manner. Since the increase in 
NPLCov ratio will also indicate an increase in the NPL ratio indirectly, the increase in non-
responding receivables influencing the profitability ratios in a negative way is an expected 
result. The same results may also be obtained via the CoR ratios.  
The CoR ratio has negative influence at a rate of -%0.177 in the model established with ROA 
dependent variable; and -2.857% in the model established with ROE dependent variable. The 
increasing rates of the credits being allocated as the counterpart for the non-responding 
receivables change the direct profitability ratios negatively with the Idle Fund Effect, 
meanwhile, they also indicate a negative result with the increase in the NPL rate in an indirect 
manner.  
The only model that has given meaningful TCTA ratio is the model that was established with 
ROE dependent variable. According to the findings, 1% increase in the TCTA ratio influences 
the ROE dependent variable at a rate of -0.336%. The negative influence of the increase in the 
investment to the credits on the profitability ratio is a result of the deposit banks receiving 
traditionally high yields from stocks and bonds and derivative tool investments. The positive 
influence of the SECTA ratio according to the model findings may be considered as the 
evidence proving this situation. The fact that the SECTA ratio gives a result that is in the 
opposite direction for participation banks is included in the model findings. Participation 
banks not receiving profits from this field is the result of the interest-free financial 
instruments being relatively new. This situation may be summarized as the deposit banks 
allocating less resources to the credits when compared with the participation banks, their 
providing active variety with stocks and bonds, their profits being enriched with stocks and 
bonds as well as credits, and the correlation between the increase in credits and the increase in 
profitability ratios being stronger than the participation banks.  
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Contrary to the participation banks, another interesting finding obtained from the control 
group is the positive influence of the TDTA ratio on dependent variables. The fact that the 
TDTA ratio of deposit banks which is the counterpart of the TDTA for participation banks 
having a negative results on dependent variables which are the expensive resources is also 
included in the findings. The TDTA ratio in the wide exemplification group for the control 
group has an influence of 0.058% in the model established with ROA dependent variable, and 
has an influence of 1.093% in the model established with ROE dependent variable. This 
situation is a function of the resource acquisition variety for the control group banks. 
Meanwhile, it is also understood from the findings that the resources acquired by the 
deflationist period being in a disadvantageous position when compared with the control group 
which benefits from the deposits in the beginning of the credit period instead of the 
participation banks which accrue profits at the end of the credit period. However, this 
situation being disadvantage stems from the fact that the majority of the deposit holders in 
participation banks have interest sensitivity instead of interest sensibility. The part of the 
society avoiding interest due to Islamic rules forming the basic funds of the participation 
banks eliminates their sensitivity to the interest rates that are paid to the deposits.  
The EQTA ratio has a positive influence for control group banks as it is the case in 
participation banks. These findings show the importance of obtaining resources concept of the 
Turkish banking system in the resources part. Resources may be made more use of as more 
efficient sources with the adequate capital ratio and the participation fund and deposits 
coming to the front line as more expensive sources. The influence of the resources on the 
capital adequacy ratio explains the positive support for profitability ratios with its supportive 
side for growth.  
The LITA ratio gave negative results in control group models just like it is the case in 
participation banks with its representing the idleness of great parts of the expensive resources. 
According to the findings of the study, the optimization of the liquidity/profitability balance 
must be one of the most important interest areas of the managers of the banks in Turkish 
banking system. The presence of liquidity management positions may be expected as a part of 
risk management, or as a separate organizational structure, or as a management board 
committee in the coming periods.  
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The most important finding of this study is the fact that the shadow variable having no place 
in the most meaningful models that were established for the control group consisting of 
regular banks throughout the period that was handled by the study. This finding is important 
in that it has given meaningful results in all the models that were established for shadow 
variable participation banks which represent the conversion of participation banks from 
special finance houses. This situation is the proof of the transition from shadow banking to 
regular banking.  
Another important finding is the result produced by the shadow variable for ROA and ROE 
dependent variables, which are the performance criteria. According to the results, the shadow 
variable has had the value of -%0.009 in the model established with ROA dependent variable, 
and -%0.113 in the model established with ROE Dependent variable, which means it 
influences the performance of the transition from shadow banking to regular banking in a 
negative way. The regulated environment increasing the costs is the most important reason for 
this. These results are similar to the findings of the empirical study conducted by Barth et al. 
covering 107 countries.45 Obtaining a more limited increase when compared with the increase 
in the costs may explain this situation. Our results showing that the regulations for banks have 
negative influences on profitability due to extra costs are parallel to the results reported by the 
previous studies in the literature. However, the findings suggesting that the performance-
decreasing influence of the regulation of shadow banks is among the pioneer findings for the 
literature. This situation has been supported with the trend graphics showing the ROA ve 
ROE ratios inclination.  
The strong increasing inclination in the ROA and ROE ratios of the special finance houses 
despite the 2001 crisis may be observed in the graphics. However, it may also be observed 
that the profitability ratios, which have been selected as the performance criteria of the special 
finance houses, which were called as participation banks from-then-on, increased strongly 
after the regular banking period which started in January 2006. This situation is the indicator 
showing that the transition to regular banking influenced the performance in a negative way. 
 
                                                          
45   Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, Ross Levine. “Bank Regulation And Supervision: What Works Best?”, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 13.2: 205-248, 2004 
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Graphics 1:  Participation Banks (Special Finance Houses) 1998-2014 ROA  
and ROE Trends 
 
 
The slightly increasing inclination in the profitability ratios, which are the performance 
criteria for Control Group banks for the period before 2005 has been converted into a slightly 
decreasing inclination with the January 2006 period. The literature showing the negative 
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effect of the increasing costs of additional regulations on banks have been supported with 
these findings. 
 
Graphics 2: Deposit Banks 1998-2014 ROA and ROE Trends 
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The increase or decrease in the curve lines of the control group banks, which does not have 
shadow/regular passes, being in a much limited level when compared with the special finance 
houses and participation banks reveals the power of the shadow variance. The ROE values 
surpassing the ROA values in 2013 for both groups for the first time is an interesting finding.  
In the period after 2005 the inclination for a decrease of profitability ratios for both groups in 
the Turkish banking system may be considered as similar findings with the findings of the 
study conducted by Kunt and Huzinga suggesting that the development of the financial 
system decreasing the profitability; if, and only if, it is considered that the participation banks 
being included in the system as regulated actors develops the financial structure. 
The other findings obtained in the study are the graphics showing the distribution of the 
residues according to the estimation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In the recent period, the concept influencing almost everybody from household to big-scale 
investors, from small-scale banks to central banks, and to policy-makers is the shadow 
banking, which is frequently mentioned among the important actors of the economy and in 
the literature.  
The system, which has benefits such as becoming specialized, transferring the funds in an 
efficient manner, distributing the risks, and producing investment alternatives, also has some 
risks like being possibly subjected to attacks, working with high leverage, and regulative 
arbitrage. The center of the debates has gathered around the regulation of the shadow banks 
and shadow banking system in terms of laws and practices and eliminating the possible risks 
that may appear for national and global economy.  
Although many institution types of various size are accepted within the shadow banking 
system in the world, many different instruments are categorized as the elements of the shadow 
banking system. In our country, there are past and present models that comply with the 
shadow banking characteristics surrounded with the literature.  
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Financial actors collecting deposit-like funds and that are not subject to banking regulations 
and do not have access to liquidity window are called as shadow banks in the literature. The 
bankers of the 1980 period may be categorized under the title of shadow banks as one of the 
most prominent models of this type of activity. The most important model is the special 
finance houses of the past that are active today under the title of participation bank. This study 
has been conducted to reveal the transition from shadow banking to regular banking with an 
econometric model; and to determine the direction of the effects of such a transition on the 
selected performance criteria.  
As the application model, the special finance houses, or with the name they are called today, 
the participation banks, which are the sole national models that have been transformed from 
shadow banking to regular banking, have been chosen. No such transition models have been 
found in the literature in international level. Special finance houses have also been selected as 
the application model of this thesis in terms of data collection. In this context, 198 
observations which include the 1998 July - 2014 December period have been provided from 
the BRSA archives. In order to determine the desired results for the period before and after 
January 2006, which is the date of the special finance houses being converted into 
participation banks with the 5411 Banking Law, the dependent and independent variables, 
which were provided from shadow variable financial statements, have been placed in the 
econometric model. The shadow variable has been represented as the dummy factor with the 
values 0 and 1 for the period before and after January 2006. The dependent and independent 
variable ratios have been taken as the reference from the studies that were conducted on 
banking performances in the literature. In addition to the reference ratios, the MKTA ratio, 
which represents the ratio of the stocks and bonds to the total active assets, have been added 
to the model since shadow banking is intensely associated with the securitization in the world. 
As the Control Group, the deposit banks, which are common in the literature, have been 
selected. The model has been regressed for participation banks (special finance houses) and 
deposit banks.  
In this context, as the most important finding of the study, in the end of the model that was 
regressed with profitability dependent variables, it has been proven that special finance 
houses have been converted into regular banks. The shadow variable has given a result that is 
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at a significant level for the participation banks, and it has been revealed that the significance 
level for deposit banks is not within acceptable limits. This situation has revealed that deposit 
banks were in the regular area in both periods, and that special finance houses were converted 
into regular banks.  
In addition, it has also been revealed with the trend graphics curve line of the coefficient value 
and dependent variables of the shadow variable that the effects of such a transition on the 
selected performance criteria have been in the negative direction.  
Results that are similar to those of the previous studies that compared Islamic banks with 
conventional ones in the literature have also been obtained. The total results are parallel to the 
results reported after the study conducted by Beck et al. suggesting that there are no 
significant differences between participation banks and deposit banks in terms of job 
orientation and active quality. No signs have been obtained pointing out to the results of the 
study conducted by Yudistra and Hassan claiming that Islamic banks are less active. The 
TDTA and SECTA ratio that are calculated for participation banks, and the findings obtained 
from the TDTA ratio that was calculated for the conventional banks are similar to the result of 
the study conducted by Naceur suggesting that the banking characteristics is definitive on 
profitability. Contrary to the results of the empirical study of Hassan claiming that the 
profitability criteria of Islamic banks are in negative correlation with capital and positive 
credit ratio, our results suggest that bot variables are positively influential on profitability. In 
addition to this, our results are similar to those obtained in the study conducted by Samad 
suggesting that there are not important differences between the profitability and liquidity 
Islamic banks and conventional banks.  
Since there are no clear principles or legal regulations defining the separation between the 
preference of the resources or the participation funds to be used in acquiring liquid assets for 
both banking systems, and because the resources obtained are used freely to acquire liquid 
assets, the normally negative correlated ratio for ROE in participation banks being positively 
correlated for ROA may be used in similar further studies. The LITA ratio being negatively 
correlated with both dependent variables as idle resources for deposit banks is a natural result. 
No previous studies were found in the literature on the source of the difference in 
participation banks.  
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The LITD Ratio also gave a negatively-correlated result with both dependent variable for 
deposit banks. The LITD Ratio being in negative correlation with the ROA and ROE values is 
normal because of the idle position of a majority of the deposits, which are expensive 
resources. However, in the participation banks side, the negative correlation between the 
LITD Ratio with the ROE dependent variable is normal; and the positive correlation with the 
ROA dependent variable deserves further studies, just like it is the case in the correlation 
results of the LITA ratio. 
In the model of our country, taking precautions to limit the interest rates by excluding the 
market system, avoiding the recording of the stocks and bonds in some way, limiting the 
liquid asset concept with money and the excluding of the belief system from the financial 
system may be considered as the elements that lead to shadow banking and risk-bearing 
factors. In addition, intensifying the regulations merely on the banks and ignoring the other 
elements of the financial system or regulating them in a loose manner leads to the way to 
regulative arbitrage.  
Instead of public limitations on the interests relying on the market system, recording the 
stocks and bonds that are exported without permission in an urgent way and applying the 
regulations on exporters to protect small investors and accepting the liquid asset concept with 
its broadest meaning will prevent the possible risks. In addition, the integration of the 
financial actors that represent the belief systems with the system, and behaving in an 
encouraging and proactive manner in order to define the similar actors and/or instruments 
within the regulations will eliminate the risks.  
Offering private sector guarantees instead of public guarantees may be a successful solution 
just like it is the case in housing projects in campaign in our country.  
One of the important and preventive regulation suggestions is the use of the request ratios that 
will be applied to the stocks and bonds which are the subject matter of the export as an 
important means of monetary policy. The experiences that will be obtained by using this 
element, which is the most important monetary policy of the future, in an active way may be 
transferred to the future. 
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The most important regulation suggestion must be ensuring an adjustment that will integrate 
all the elements of the financial system. 
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